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THE REGULATION OF BUSINESSMEN: SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF GOVEMMENT
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"THIS is a book," its author states, "on the social and personal sources of
friction in economic regulation."' Those who wish to reject the pessimism of
Adam Smith and believe in the reality of cooperation, trusteeship, and relative-
ly frictionless social change will be heartened by this study. Professor Lane
of the Department of Political Science of Yale University thinks it possible
that "the conflict of interests associated with economic regulation can be ad-
justed without weakening the force of that regulation."2 This result will make
"implausible and remote" the Marxian solution. For, "in the growing knowl-
edge of inter-personal and inter-group relations there is an instrument for
social change more powerful than the dialectic .... .,3
Professor Lane has limited his analysis to federal peacetime regulation of
trade practices, wages and hours, and labor relations. He has drawn data
primarily from interviews with twenty-five businessmen in two New England
states, seven officials in federal agencies, a content analysis of Connecticut
Industry, magazine of the Manufacturers Association of Connecticut, and a
special study of the New England shoe industry.4
Though federal regulations are "inoffensive in any serious sense and reveal
a moderately simple pattern," 5 they have evoked considerable protest from the
business community-a protest which has been expressed in books, trade jour-
nals, press releases, "grassroots lobbying," public relations campaigns, and
contributions to the Republican Party. In the opinion of Professor Lane the
economic costs of regulation do not adequately explain the bitter attack on
"regimentation." The hostility, he suggests, derives rather from the "psychic
cost."8 "While regulation came to businessmen with a relatively low price
tag, it nevertheless was burdensome and exacted a toll of anxiety, frustration,
and dejection beyond all relation to the economic cost."7 It challenged their
ideology, attacked "the business ego, psychologically a most traumatic experi-
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accustomed," and "aroused new anxieties . . . in a time already tense with
doubt and foreboding."
After the first outburst of resentment and criticism-prolonged in the re-
action to the National Labor Relations Act presumably because "it reduced
business power vis-a-vis another ... social group"o-there is typically a period
of adjustment and accommodation. While "there seems to be no over-all long
term trend toward favorable references to government regulation,"10 there is
a "decline in expressed hostility to government regulatory measures."1" Con-
tent analysis of Connecticut Industry suggests "an alteration in the attention
frame such that government-business relationships occupy a smaller attention
area and the problems of production occupy a larger area of business atten-
tion."'1 2 This change, Professor Lane believes, reflects the partial achieve-
ment of a "symbiotic relationship with government."13 But the adjustment
of business leaders is imperfect, despite "the healing measures of recultura-
tion,"'14 because of friction between bureaucrats and businessmen. "There is
a social gulf between business management and government management, at
least during reform, that is, regulatory administrations, and probably at other
times as well."'15 Misunderstanding arises from: "(1) differential occupation
traits, (2) differential development of language, (3) differential standards of
evaluation, and (4) differential reference groups."'1 To overcome these ob-
stacles to effective and harmonious regulation the bureaucrats "must be aware
of the nature of the situation which confronts them."'17 This entails "the proper
orientation of administrative officers" and "an understanding of the real na-
ture of business grievances"'18 to be obtained by opinion surveys and content
analysis of business publications. Administrators must use the "guided situa-
tions (such as a hearing or a conference)" to provide "a cartharsis for the
hostile emotions."'10 They must also seek "to reduce the sense of deprivation"
and "effect a restructuring of business attitudes."20 Professor Lane is con-
fident that if "the regulators demonstrate a tolerant endurance, even a sym-
pathetic understanding, of initial hostility and if they also move to minimize
the deprivations which regulation imposes upon business, they have prepared

















The presentation of charts, diagrams, and tables, and the reliance on the
language and concepts of sociology, social psychology, and psychoanalysis may
not totally convince some readers that Professor Lane's analysis has contributed
significantly either to the understanding of business-government relations or
to the resolution of conflicts arising from economic controls. The history of
regulation in the United States reveals a rather consistent pattern. Regulatory
measures passed in response to widespread discontent with business abuses
have been rapidly vitiated by prolonged controversy in the courts, by the failure
of Congress to appropriate adequate funds for enforcement, by the launching
by business of public relations campaigns to distort and misrepresent the pur-
pose and result of regulations, or by the transformation of the enforcement
agency into an advocate for the business point of view. Sometimes the last
comes about through deliberate appointment of personnel hostile to the enforce-
ment of regulations, as recently in the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Federal Power Commission, and the Federal Communications Commis-
sion; more commonly, perhaps, it comes about because the regulatory body
is-subjected to pressure only from the economic interest it regulates. Professor
Lane's concern that the administrator acquire the "proper orientation" seems
to be somewhat misplaced in an era when devoted public servants have re-
ceived rather short shrift from Congress and Executive alike. Whether officials
have recently relied on public opinion surveys and content analyses to minimize
damage to the business ego is not clear, but there will be those who doubt the
existence of widespread frustration among businessmen during the present
administration. There is merit, of course, in not deliberately provoking the
emotional resistance of individuals to law enforcement. Nevertheless, one may
doubt that any selection of language by Leland Olds would have won him the
plaudits of the electric power industry or the enthusiastic support of natural
gas producers, so long as he persisted in protecting consumers' interests.
Where the cost to industry of a regulation, e.g., wages and hours, or trade
practices, can be passed on to consumers or the government in the form of
higher prices, reconciliation may be rapid. In such instances it is conceivable
that "professionals"--personnel men and public relations men-may convince
management to cooperate with the regulation. In wide areas, however, the
implementation of regulations impinges upon the ability of economic groups
to make key decisions in society. This direct limitation of power must ulti-
mately be resolved in contests between political parties. There is at least some
indication that opposing economic interests are increasingly being represented
in opposing political parties. This may be more significant for the implementa-
tion of effective regulation in the public interest than any amount of "group
therapy" or even the development of "euphoric empathy" between public
officials and businessmen.
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